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Abstract
One of the least settled issues in US offshore oil policy is the
"best" scheme to capture resource rents arising from hydrocarbon
production. This paper analyses the impact of alternative bidding
systems on the intertemporal production path and on the firm's
investment decision. It concludes that with the exception of the
pure profit share system all other pure or mixed bidding systems
are likely to have a distortive effect on production and, thus,
eventually lead to a dissipation of economic rent. Further, no
leasing system authorised by current public law is found to be
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One of the least settled issues in US offshore oil policy is the
"best" scheme to capture resource rents arising from hydrocarbon
production. After almost twenty years of mineral rights assign-
ment on the basis of bonus bidding, the landowner (the federal
government in this case) began to experiment with alternative
systems (Table 1). Payment schedules other than a cash bonus with
a fixed ad-valorem royalty were already authorized by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1954 but not explicitly required
until the 1978 amendments became effective as public law. The
amendments determine that alternative schemes must be used in not
less than 20 percent and not more than 60 percent of the total
area offered for lease .
This regulation can be considered to be an outcome of the long
debate on the pros and cons for the traditional bonus bidding
system. Opponents of this system have argued that it would con-
stitute a serious obstacle to competition because it discrimi-
nated against small firms. Given the type of auction used, a
sealed bid, first-price auction, a few big oil companies would
benefit from oligopolistic behaviour by submitting bids that sys-
tematically underestimate the true tract value. This would final-
ly prevent the government from receiving a "fair" value for the
leases .
In spite of the plausibility of this argument, empirical evidence
published hitherto has clearly failed to prove its relevance . In
any case, these results could perhaps help to better understand
how the traditional bidding system works, but certainly not to
For a recent review of institutional issues see DESVOUSGES,
PIETTE (2 984).
2
These arguments have been put forward very often. For a discus-
sion see, for example, REECE (1978).
To the extent that the level of rates of return in the offshore
oil industry serves as an indicator for competition, the dis-
cussion between MEAD et al. (1982) and DWORIN et al. (1983) in
the National Tax Journal is a good example of ambiguity in this
field of empirical research.- 2 -
Table 1 - Bidding Systems for US OCS Hydrocarbon Leases
Bidding Systems Authorized Bidding Systems Used
(1954-3980)
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Source; OCSLAA (1978); USDOI (1982); OGJ, var. issues.- 3 -
judge its performance relative to alternative schemes. Unfortu-
nately, a thorough empirical analysis of the alternative systems
is not feasible yet due to the fact that only a very small number
of tracts have been so far offered for lease under alternative
payment schemes; most of these schemes have not even been imple-
mented yet (Table 1) . Therefore, for the time being, qualitative
and simulation studies of different bidding systems have more to
2
say on their relative performance .
Going through publications along these lines reveals that most of
them take the view of the landowner; they aim at identifying the
bidding system which maximizes economic rent capture by the gov-
ernment . While it can hardly be denied that every particular
bidding system has a specific impact on government revenue from
leasing, it is not at all clear why there should be a special
distribution problem in the offshore oil industry which is absent
in other industries. For natural resources are capital assets and
should be treated just like capital is being treated in other in-
dustries .
Economists who stress the relevance of distributional aspects in
offshore hydrocarbon leases obviously look at oil resources in
It should be noted that even in the case of productive tracts
leased in the 1970s, many of them did not start to produce be-
fore the beginning of the 1980s. This means that an ex post em-
pirical analysis based on historical data of these tracts will
have to be postponed until the hydrocarbons discovered have
been exhausted. Less reliable but earlier analysis can, of
course, proceed on the basis of extrapolated data.
2
Simulation experiments were done, among others, by ROGGE MARSH
(1980) and SLADE (1984).
3 See REECE (1979), KALTER et al. (1975), GARNAUT, CLUNIES ROSS
(1983), ROBINSON (1982), EMERSON, GARNAUT (1984).
4
Capital usually generates three kinds of income: income accru-
ing to capital owners, income accruing to capital users, and
income accruing to the government in concept of tax revenue.
The fact that in the case of the US OCS the government expects
to receive two kinds" of income, income from ownership and in-
come from taxation,- is, of course, a feature that makes this
business somewhat different from others. But fortunately, this
difference does not seem to offer any complications.- 4 -
the same way David Ricardo looked at land from the viewpoint of
the labour theory of value. Ricardo had to make a difference be-
tween capital and land simply because the return to land could
not be explained as the reward to past labour. Today we know the
inconsistencies of the labour theory of value and that applying
marginal productivity or opportunity cost analysis the economic
1 2 distinction between capital and land necessarily disappears '
Apart from there being no sound reason to concentrate on distri-
butional problems in offshore oil, it is very often forgotten
that there might be a trade-off between efficiency on the one
hand and the objective of income maximization by the landowner on
the other. At least from a certain threshold of lease payments
upwards, these payments could represent such a burden to the re-
source user that he/she could be induced to decide to turn to
other more profitable activities. Thus, in the long run, income
maximization by the lessor could have the opposite effect, name-
ly, instead of resulting in high lease revenue until the resource
is depleted actual lease revenue could decline very early, while
a substantial part of the resource stock remains in the ground .
This argument sounds like a Laffer Curve for government income
A long line of economists (among others A. MARSHALL, K. MENGER,
and John S. MILL) realized that there was no good reason for
confining Ricardo's theory of rent differential to land; the
same idea could readily be applied to all forms of capital and
also to labour. In spite of this, the concept of surplus dif-
ferential did not have much success and proved impractical for
taxation.
2
In the US, firms engaged in OCS leases are already subject to
special tax treatment. On the one hand they are allowed to take
advantage of a depletion allowance and, further, to expense
certain costs (intangible drilling costs, dry hole costs) as
incurred; on the other, they are subject to the Windfall Pro-
fits Tax which directly influences the profitability of off-
shore operations, in spite of being deductable from the tax
base for the Corporation Income Tax.
Evidence of such a tendency to overtax natural resource ven-
tures has been found by EMERSON and LLOYD (1983) for Australia
and by EMERSON et al. (1984) for Indonesia. Also KEMP and ROSE
(1984) conclude in their comparative study of sixteen fiscal
regimes applied to oil production that "the majority of systems
extracted over 100 per cent of the economic rents ... providing
a direct disincentive to field development" (KEMP, ROSE, 1984,
p. 194).- 5
from offshore leases. It is illustrated in Figure 1 where T~ re-
presents the leasing rate that leads to the highest total income
from hydrocarbon leases; every rate higher than TQ interferes
with profitability and thus induces firms to withdraw from the
offshore business. A lower interest in offshore oil ultimately
decreases total government revenue from offshore leases .
In the present paper the case is made for an efficient leasing
system. It is argued that the best use of natural resources by
society can be achieved only if the regime to govern offshore hy-
drocarbon production is characterized by allocative efficiency
instead of revenue maximization by the landowner. This is the
view of the resource user but it is also strongly suggested by
recent research in the theory of natural resources, a line of
economic thought more often than not ignored in discussions of
issues in public lands management. The rationale for this ap-
proach is given in Section II which also deals with the impact of
alternative bidding systems on the optimal intertemporal rate of
mineral extraction. In Section III the influence of different
lease payments on the firm's investment decision is analyzed.
Finally, in the last section the main findings are summarized and
some conclusions for offshore oil policy are drawn.
II. The Impact of Alternative Bidding Systems on Offshore Hydro-
carbon Production
A standard proposition in natural resources theory is that pri-
vately and socially optimal time paths of resource extraction can
be achieved in a competitive economy provided the producer bears
the corresponding user or opportunity costs (Dasgupta, Heal,
1979; Siebert, 1983b). In an intertemporal context user costs re-
present the utility foregone to future generations due to today's
production. They are equal to the net present value of the re-
source stock, with the discount rate reflecting the weight of fu-
ture generations in the cake-eating problem. In policy terms,
In fact, it not only reduces the government's income from
public lands but also ordinary tax revenue from offshore oil.- 6 -








user costs stand for the lessee's payments to the landowner for
the mineral rights . If competitive markets exist, both for the
mineral rights and for the minerals themselves, the resulting
user costs will lead to an optimal time profile of resource pro-
2
duction without distorting investment decisions . If, hov/ever,
the lessee is required to pay in excess of what the correct user
costs would be optimal intertemporal allocation is unlikely and
1 It is also possible to charge these user costs through specific
taxes instead of leasing payments. Examples of this are the
Brown Tax and the Resource Rent Tax. On this see GARNAUT and
CLUNIES ROSS (1983) .
Such an outcome is subject to given time patterns of mineral
scarcity and interest rates.— 7 —
the potential economic rent could be totally dissipated. Similar-
ly, if the lessee is not required to pay any user costs misallo-
cation of resources and mineral rent dissipation would follow .
It is therefore a relevant policy question to identify the bid-
ding system that is comparatively less distortive with respect to
the firm's production and investment plans. In this section cash
bonus bidding, royalty bidding, and profit share bidding shall be
discussed, both as pure schemes and as the variable part of a
mixed system including fixed payments. Whilst this section deals
with the effects of these systems on production, the next section
will address their impact on investment.
The effect of a cash bonus on production can be easily studied if
it is assumed that the individual firm will treat the bonus pay-
ment for productive leases as ordinary fixed costs for the pur-
pose of long-term production planning. For this case, Siebert
(1983a) has shown that fixed costs are not neutral for the firm's
intertemporal supply behaviour. Particularly, for any given price
path exogenous increases in fixed costs will lead to higher than
optimal production rates and thus to sooner resource depletion
(production path P, in Figure 2). Only a cash bonus payment that
truly reflects the (expected) user costs will guarantee neutrali-
ty in the sense that it creates an incentive for the firm to
choose the optimal.rate of extraction (production path P« in Fi-
gure 2) . A bonus that overestimates the value of a tract will
thus have an impact on production similar to that of a higher in-
2
terest rate : Current profits compare favourably with the present
value of future profits giving the firm an incentive to extract
now.
It should be stressed that this result holds only under govern-
ment ownership of public lands. If the lessee were given full
ownership over the resources, these would become a part of
his/her capital assets. Then, competitive capital and mineral
markets would contribute to an efficient use of natural re-
sources.
2
This result contrasts with the widely held opinion in the lite-
rature on OCS leases that the bonus bidding system is neutral.
See MCDONALD (1979) and MEAD et al. (1983). The alleged neutra-
lity of bonus bidding is usually derived from a static analy-
sis.- 8 -
Figure 2 Extraction Paths and Cumulated Hydrocarbon Produc-






It is sometimes maintained that winning bids are always too high,
and that there is always some "money left on the table". If such
a proposition were true, any bidding system and especially bonus
bidding would be distortive by definition. But this argument is
not convincing, for firms usually determine the profit-maximizing
bonus for profitable ventures before submitting their bids. It
could be incompatible with their profit-maximizing behaviour if
they would go for a tract at any price. This does, however, not
mean that firms participating at lease auctions do not have a
certain range within which to set the final bid. But it should be
clear that such (narrow) ranges have nothing to do with "money
left on the table". On the other hand, differences among bids
submitted for the same tract by different firms reflect diffe-
rences in the individual firm's endowment with information and in- 9 -
the firm's expectations about the risk of drilling a dry hole,
the size of the potential resource stock, future hydrocarbon
prices, production costs and interest rates. Auctions have been
shown to cope quite well with such uncertainties because they
function as "economizers of information" (Smith, 1982). Of
course, the risk of over- or underestimating the value of a given
tract remains with the firm. But this risk is always present in
entrepreneurial activity when future projects have to be evalu-
ated. The fact that bad estimates of tract values may have dis-
tortive production effects adds a new kind of risk to the risks
just mentioned. However, bad estimates are risks inherent to the
process of bidding under uncertainty and not to a particular bid-
ding system.
The impact of an ad-valorem royalty on production has been for-
mally analyzed by Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz (1980) and by Long
and Sinn (1984). As it turns out, constant royalties are never
neutral; they work like a lower interest rate in that they create
incentives for a postponement of production (production path P~
in Figure 2). Optimal royalties can be derived but only for the
variable case. A variable royalty that declines over time at a
different pace than the optimal royalty has an effect similar to
that of a constant royalty: the firm will thus postpone produc-
tion. In contrast, if the variable royalty increases more steeply
than the optimal royalty, its impact on production resembles the
one of a higher interest rate: the firm has an incentive to ac-
celerate current production because the present value of future
profits does not compare favourably with current profits (produc-
tion path P, in Figure 2). In terms of production cumulated over
a finite time horizon a rising royalty will result in a higher
than optimal rate of production and in an early resource exhaus-
tion (point t, in Figure 2) ; a falling royalty will lower the
production rate and thus a share of the resource stock will re-
main in the ground at the end of the period.- 10 -
The influence of profit shares has been also addressed by Das-
gupta, Heal and Stiglitz (1980). These authors find that a con-
stant profit share has no distortive effect on intertemporal re-
source extraction. A variable profit share, though, has conse-
quences for production: a rising profit share brings about a
higher than optimal rate of production and rapid resource deple-
tion, in analogy to a rising royalty. Finally, a falling profit
share contributes to slower than optimal resource extraction.
The results from natural resources theory reviewed above in the
context of US OCS hydrocarbon leases are also helpful in estab-
lishing the neutrality of mixed bidding systems which are actual-
ly used in OCS lease sales (Table 1). A cash bonus with either a
fixed constant royalty or a sliding scale royalty is thus always
more distortive than a cash bonus associated to a fixed profit
share. In the latter scheme there is only one potential source of
production distortions, the cash bonus, whereas in the former
both the variable and the fixed parts can be non-neutral. On the
same token, royalty bidding with a fixed profit share should be
more neutral than a system with the same bid variable but stipu-
lating either a fixed bonus or another royalty. Then, a cash
bonus with a fixed profit share should be as good or bad as
royalty bidding with a fixed profit share. Finally, profit share
bidding should be much less distortive than any one of the above
systems, independently of the fixed payment stipulated. However,
it must be stressed that pure profit share bidding is superior to
all other pure or mixed schemes with respect to production neu-
trality .
Ill: The Impact of Alternative Bidding Systems on Investment
Firms interested in offshore hydrocarbons face the problem of
having to compete for mineral rights at public auctions on the
basis of pre-exploratory information on the tracts offered for
LELAND (1978) draws a similar conclusion.- 11 -
lease. Every firm can further be assumed to have identified the
tracts it perceives to be profitable and to have established the
corresponding probability of drilling a dry well. Thus the typi-
cal firm can be thought of as willing to pick a portfolio of
tracts subject to its attitude towards risk and its budget con-
straint. For simplicity, let us assume here, that this problem
can be reduced to the ranking of alternative projects with the
same risk according to some profitability criterion. Taking, for
example, the (expected) net present value (NPV) as an indicator
of profitability it is easy to find out that the NPV of a project
is a decreasing function of the lease payments as shown in Figure
3. It can be seen from Figure 3 that the characteristic features
of a project (prices, production, costs, etc.), together with al-
ternative leasing rates, determine the slope of the NPV curve. A
i
particular royalty or profit share - if constant - will determine
only a point on the curve; different royalties and profit shares
will thus bring about a movement along the curve. In contrast,
different cash bonus payments will shift the NPV curve to the
left (higher bonus) or to the right (lower bonus).
Obviously, a given NPV level is compatible with alternative pure
as well as mixed lease payments. Also, a given NPV level can be
associated with different values of the variable and fixed parts
of a given mixed bidding system. Consequently, a given impact on
the NPV can be achieved using very different payment systems, the
latter being virtually interchangeable. Now, what happens when
two projects are compared? This can be seen from Figure 4. If the
firm decides to bid a cash bonus equal to bQ for project II and
its fixed royalty is lower than R., then project I appears to be
more profitable than project II. If the fixed royalty for project
I lies somewhere between Rfi and R'., then project II turns out to
be more profitable. But if the firm sets its optimal bonus at b.
project II will remain more profitable for all royalties lower
than R'Q. Changing the combination of variable and fixed payments
may. lead to different outcomes regarding the ranking of two or
more projects.- 12 -









From the above discussion the following conclusions can be drawn.
First, lease payments always have an impact on profitability and,
thus, on investment decisions. Second, the ranking of projects
can be significantly affected by mixed bidding systems. It is,
unfortunately, an empirical question dependent on every particu-
lar set of projects to determine the influence of alternative
bidding systems with respect to project rankings . There is no
such thing as a bidding system that is neutral for resource allo-
cation.
1 For mixed systems to have a similar effect as pure systems it
is necessary to assume that firms subtract the fixed part of
the lease payments from the amount bid in order to arrive at a
quasi-pure scheme (DAVIS et al., 1933). Only pure systems of
variable payments can avoid the situation that some tracts can
be offered for lease under unprofitable lease conditions.- 13 -
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These qualitative conclusions are in line with empirical studies
of the impact of alternative fiscal systems on the development of
offshore oil fields . For, due to the importance of lease pay-
ments for profitability, high cost (i. e. deep water) or other-
wise marginal fields will be seriously affected particularly by
fixed payments, which do not take into consideration exploration
and development costs.
1 See, for example, KEMP and ROSE (1984).- 14 -
IV. Summary of Findings and Policy Conclusions
The admittedly limited qualitative analysis in this paper has
shown that the selection of an optimal bidding system is not an
easy matter. With the exception of the pure profit share system,
all other pure or mixed bidding systems are likely to have a dis-
tortive effect on production and, thus, eventually lead to a mis-
allocation of resources and to a dissipation of economic rent.
Regarding the profitability of tracts offered for lease, no leas-
ing system authorized by current public law can be said to be
neutral. Unfortunately, it is not possible to generally identify
the lease payment which would be least distortive for investment
decisions.
The high sensitivity of resource extraction and its profitability
with respect to alternative bidding systems has some important
consequences for offshore oil policy. First, mixed systems with
one part fixed by the landowner without taking into account costs
of individual firms are always a second best solution compared to
pure bidding systems. Wrongly set leasing rates might discrimi-
nate against smaller firms. Also, they could be considered to
constitute disincentives for the development of smaller or mar-
ginal reservoirs. Second, only pure profit share bidding without
any lower bounds (these depend on the particular project) can
guarantee efficient resource allocation in the offshore industry
as well as an efficient use of natural resources without dissi-
pating mineral rents.- 15 -
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